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China's Participation in Global Governance from a Comparative Perspective

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KEYWORDS: CHINA; GLOBAL GOVERNANCE; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; CIVIL SOCIETY; INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This article examines comparative data on countries' participation in global governance and explains China's relatively low involvement in global governance.

MAIN ARGUMENT

Compared with the other emerging powers in the so-called BRIC group (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), China has underparticipated in global governance in terms of contributing personnel, finance, and ideas to major multilateral institutions and programs. This article seeks to answer the question of why China has not become more involved in global governance from the perspectives of both supply and demand. The low supply of China's contributions results from the limited interest of the Chinese government and limited capacity of both the government and Chinese society. The low demand for China's involvement in global governance is due to the continued ambivalence of the international community toward China. The U.S. and other countries should, and to a limited degree can, encourage China to take on a bigger role in providing global public goods.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

- China has maintained a low profile in global governance, despite its growing economic power and the rhetoric of being a responsible great power, and there is little evidence that it will seek international leadership. Contrary to concerns over China's imminent takeover of the U.S. role in the world, Beijing appears to have limited interest in and capacity for greater involvement in global governance.
- Because the domestic and international sources of this relative passivity in global governance are rooted in the Chinese political system, political reform in China would likely increase its capacity and status as an international leader.
- The U.S. and other external actors can encourage and enable China to play a bigger role in providing global public goods by promoting the growth of Chinese civil society and more fully embracing China as a member of the international community.

For the last two decades, the rise of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has almost become cliché among circles of policymakers, corporate leaders, and academics, as well as the general public. Whether China's rise presents a threat or an opportunity has been a matter of opinion, but few disagree that it is an important new reality in world politics and the global economy—one with enormous implications for how the world is governed. For instance, China's rapid industrialization and urbanization inevitably has economic and environmental effects that spill over its borders. Likewise, the stronger China's military becomes, the more intense the security dilemma tends to be in the region.

These passive consequences of China's rise for global governance have been the subject of much scholarly work.¹ However, most policymakers and analysts have paid little attention to the fact that, despite its rising power, China has thus far maintained a relatively low profile on the international stage.² Beyond its "core interests" of defending national sovereignty and territorial integrity (including Tibet and Taiwan) and securing access to energy and natural resources in other parts of the world (most notably in Africa and Latin America), the Chinese government has only played a limited and sporadic role in most areas of global governance.

This article studies China's role in global governance from a comparative perspective. It demonstrates that measured against the other emerging powers in the so-called BRIC group (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), China has underparticipated in global governance. This phenomenon is attributed to a number of domestic and international factors, including the motivation and capability of China and the attitude of the international community toward it. The article suggests that the United States and others should, and can to a limited degree, encourage China to play a bigger role in the provision of global public goods by promoting political liberalization and more fully embracing China as a member of the international community.

¹ See, for example, G. John Ikenberry, "America's Challenge: The Rise of China and the Future of Liberal International Order," New American Foundation, Policy Papers, July 2011; and Jing Gu, John Humphrey, and Dirk Messner, "Global Governance and Developing Countries: The Implications of the Rise of China," *World Development* 36, no. 2 (2008): 274.

² There are some exceptions, where scholars note that China has expanded its participation in international governing mechanisms but that this participation remains below the level expected. See Alastair Iain Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" *International Security* 27, no. 4 (2003): 5–56; Bates Gill, "China's Evolving Role in Global Governance," in *China's Rise: Diverging U.S.-EU Perceptions and Approaches*, ed. Bates Gill and Gudrun Wackner (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2005), 9–15; and David Shambaugh, *China Goes Global: The Partial Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). While these scholars use examples or statistics to make this point, we have not yet seen data as comprehensive and systematic as what is presented in this article.

This article consists of four sections:

- ≈ pp. 92–99 describe China’s participation in global governance along several dimensions and compare China with the three other BRIC countries.
- ≈ pp. 99–103 analyze China’s motivation and capability for participation in global governance.
- ≈ pp. 104–111 examine the attitude of the international community toward China, which has contributed to the current state of China’s involvement in global governance.
- ≈ pp. 112–114 conclude by discussing what the United States and other countries should and can do to encourage China to take on more responsibility in providing global public goods.

CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Broadly speaking, “global governance” refers to the complex of institutions and processes that govern how things happen in the world. In its origin, the concept was intended to express something that could be distinguished from “global government”—i.e., a legitimate, authoritative organized power (as yet nonexistent) governing the world.³ By contrast, global governance is less permanently established, more fluid, and continually being constructed and reconstructed. The mechanisms of global governance consist of international organizations, such as the United Nations and various intergovernmental organizations at the regional level; transnational entities, such as the World Economic Forum, Greenpeace, and Amnesty International; and various formal and informal international frameworks for everything from human rights to WMDs and from environmental protection to aviation safety.

We propose that a state’s active involvement in global governance can be broken down into three general categories: personnel contributions, financial contributions, and ideational contributions to the types of organizations and frameworks mentioned above. Along these lines, we have developed an index of participation in global governance. A country’s score in the first category (personnel contributions) is based on the manpower it provides for United Nations staff and peacekeeping operations (PKO). Its

³ James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).

score in the second category (financial contributions) is based on donations to various funds, programs, and organizations dedicated to major global governance issue areas, such as poverty relief and global health. A country's score in the third category (ideational contributions) is based on the ideas it contributes to global governance and the involvement of its civil society in global governance issues.

In this article a state's personnel contributions to global governance are measured using several indicators. The number of nationals each state has working as UN staff members is the first indicator used to assess this type of participation. This figure is assessed relative to a state's population size and its gross national income (GNI), given that larger or more prosperous states should be able to dedicate more personnel to UN organizations.⁴ A state's presence in UN PKOs is a second indicator, which is measured in terms of both the number of contributed personnel relative to population size and the total number of casualties suffered in recent missions.⁵ These figures provide a useful means of evaluating a country's willingness to put soldiers, advisers, and police officers in harm's way in the interests of UN PKOs, a key component of global governance.

State financial contributions are evaluated by examining voluntary commitments to major funds addressing key sectors of global governance, as well as subscriptions at major international economic organizations. These figures are evaluated relative to both GNI and GNI per capita. Wealthier states with strong economies are likely to contribute more financially to these funds, and evaluating commitments relative to GNI and GNI per capita controls for this potential dynamic. Funding reports and donor data from sixteen funds covering drug trafficking and criminal justice, global health, poverty relief and humanitarian aid, environmental protection, human rights, and fair labor standards are used to compare states' financial involvement in global

⁴ Staff figures are taken from "Gender Distribution of All Staff (P1 to USG and GS) by Nationality and Level at Headquarters, Other Established Offices and Project Posts, with Appointment of One Year or More, as of 31 December 2009," United Nations, International Training Centre of the International Labour Organization \approx <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/pdf/Nationalities2010/ITCILO1.pdf>.

⁵ Manpower figures are taken from "Peacekeeping Statistics: Troop and Police Contributors," UN, December 2012 \approx <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml>. Casualties are recorded for missions undertaken from 1990 to the present. Casualty figures are taken from "Peacekeeping Statistics: Fatalities by Nationality and Mission," UN \approx http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/fatalities/documents/StatsByNationalityMission_2.pdf.

governance.⁶ Additionally, this article assesses each state's subscriptions at the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), which determine voting powers in these organizations. Subscription data provides a useful indicator of the extent of countries' contributions to and involvement in major international financial organizations.

Finally, we gauge the ideational contributions of countries to global governance. The first indicator used to evaluate this category of participation is the number of ideas, norms, and initiatives a country has sponsored or proposed. Indian activists and NGOs, for example, led the opposition against the spread of genetically modified crops by global agribusiness, while Brazil—alongside France—helped propose and found UNITAID, an international facility to purchase drugs that combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis. Civil-society participation in global governance affairs serves as a second indicator of a state's ideational contribution, because innovative ideas often come out of diverse civic groups. To assess this critical component of a country's involvement in global governance, the number of NGOs from each state that participated in seven major UN summits is examined using relevant UN reports.⁷ While this figure does not necessarily capture variations in the intensity or extent of an NGO's participation at these UN summits, it does provide a useful general indicator of how many NGOs from each state sent representatives or took part in the planning or execution of the conferences. The number of NGOs from each state involved with the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs through consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Conference of NGOs in Consultative Relationship with the

⁶ Funds include contributions to the UN International Drug Control Program (2006–7), UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Fund (2006–7), Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (2001–12), World Health Organization (2008–10), UN Population Fund (2007–9), UN Development Programme multi-donor trust funds and joint programs (2007–11), UN World Food Programme (2008–10), UN Environment Programme (2009), UN Global Environmental Facility Trust Fund (up to 2006), UN Convention to Combat Desertification (2006–7), UN Refugee Agency Contributions (2009), International Committee of the Red Cross (2010), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (2011), UN Development Fund for Women (2009), UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2010), and International Labour Organization (2006–10).

⁷ These summits include the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, the 1994 UN International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, the 1995 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Copenhagen, the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, the Second UN Conference on Human Settlements in Istanbul, the 2001 World Conference against Racism in Durban, and the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg.

UN (CoNGO), or the Commission on Sustainable Development provides an additional indicator of ideational participation.⁸

Using our index based on these indicators and figures from the last few years, we compare China's participation in global governance with the participation of the other three BRIC countries—Brazil, Russia, and India. Each country receives a score for the three major categories, as well as for several subcategories. Scores for the subcategories are based on the average ranking the country receives out of the four states in question in a given subcategory. For instance, China's score for drugs and crime is based on the average ranking of its contributions to the UN International Drug Control Program relative to GNI and GNI per capita and its contributions to the UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Fund relative to GNI and GNI per capita. The scores for the three main categories (personnel, financial, and ideational), which are presented in **Table 1**, are simply the average of all pertinent subcategories. Lower scores indicate a better average ranking and greater participation by a state in a particular category.

China is ranked last in all three categories. The worst score it receives is for personnel contributions, which indicates that China has not contributed as much in terms of manpower as the other BRIC states relative to its population size. It has suffered fewer casualties in operations starting after 1990 and has contributed fewer police officers, trainers, and soldiers from 2007 to 2011. China also has fewer nationals in UN staff positions relative to its population size.

⁸ Integrated Civil Society Organizations (iCSO) System Database, NGO Branch of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs ~ <http://esango.un.org/civilsociety/login.do>. This database was used to determine the number of NGOs headquartered in each state with general, special, and roster consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), as well as the number of NGOs accredited by the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD). Conference on NGOs in Consultative Relationship with the UN (CoNGO), "Membership List," 2007 ~ http://www.ngocongo.org/congo/files/congo_membership_directory_2007.pdf. NGOs can apply to receive consultative status with ECOSOC if they are involved in some or all the issues handled by ECOSOC, meet certain standards, and are approved by the Committee of NGOs and ECOSOC itself. ECOSOC facilitates the participation of these NGOs in UN conferences, provides resources to enable the NGOs to better fulfill their objectives, and collects quadrennial reports on these NGOs' activities. CoNGO is another forum for NGO participation in the UN. It is composed primarily of NGOs with ECOSOC consultative status and encourages the discussion of substantive issues related to global governance in various NGO committees. Finally, NGOs involved in the CSD participate in the commission's work, following up on the implementation of Agenda 21 from the 1992 UN summit in Rio de Janeiro. Tallying up the number of NGOs from each state that are involved in these various forums provides a general picture of the extent of each state's ideational commitment via civil society to global governance. All these figures, including NGO participation in major summits, ECOSOC, CoNGO, and the CSD, are assessed relative to state population size and GNI per capita. These factors are controlled for because countries with larger populations are likely to have more NGOs, while countries that are more prosperous are likely to have more capable and active NGOs.

TABLE 1

Participation in Global Governance, 1993–2011

Country	China	Brazil	India	Russia
<i>Personnel contribution scores</i>	4.0	2.1	2.1	1.8
Casualties in PKOs^a	4.0	2.0	3.0	1.0
PKO personnel contributions^a	4.0	1.8	1.3	3.0
UN staff^b	4.0	2.5	2.0	1.5
<i>Financial contribution scores</i>	3.3	2.5	2.3	2.3
Drugs and crime^c	4.0	1.0	2.5	2.5
Global health^c	2.5	3.9	2.1	1.7
Poverty and humanitarian relief^c	2.6	2.6	2.2	2.7
Environmental protection^c	3.0	2.8	1.7	2.6
Human rights^c	3.5	2.2	2.2	2.2
Subscriptions^c	3.8	3.3	1.5	1.5
Labor standards^c	4.0	1.8	3.0	2.8
<i>Ideational contribution scores</i>	3.4	2.7	1.1	3.3
NGO conference participation (relative to population size)	3.7	2.8	1.3	2.3
NGO conference participation (relative to GNI per capita)	2.9	3.1	1.0	3.1
NGOs associated with ECOSOC, CSD, and CoNGO (relative to population size)	3.9	2.4	1.0	3.9
NGOs associated with ECOSOC, CSD, and CoNGO (relative to GNI per capita)	2.9	2.6	1.0	3.9
<i>Overall contribution score</i>	3.6	2.4	1.8	2.5

Note: *a* indicates relative to population size, *b* indicates the average value relative to population size and GNI, and *c* indicates average value relative to GNI and GNI per capita.

China also ranks last in financial contributions, which means that it has not provided substantial funding to global governance relative to GNI and GNI per capita. Within this category, China contributed remarkably little to funds involving drugs and crime and labor standards, earning a ranking of 4 for these subcategories. China's influence in the IMF and World Bank via subscriptions is also fairly low relative to its GNI and GNI per capita. Interestingly, however, China provided more funding than Brazil in the subcategory of global health, and more funding than Russia for poverty and

humanitarian relief. In particular, China's donations to the International Fund for Agricultural Development have been quite substantial.⁹

China's ideational contributions are also small compared with the other BRICs. China has yet to provide many major ideas or set many important norms pertaining to global governance. The Chinese government points to the ideas of "peace and development" and a "harmonious world" as China's contribution to global governance. However, these official mantras are quite abstract and have not become widely shared norms around the world. Likewise, few governance ideas have come from China's civil society. As shown in Table 1, China's NGO participation in conferences and various UN forums relative to its population size has been quite poor. Also, while NGO participation for China fares better when compared with its GNI per capita, China's overall score in this category puts it solidly behind Brazil and India.

Limited involvement in global governance has been part of China's overall approach to foreign relations in recent decades. At the beginning of the reform era, Deng Xiaoping abandoned the revolutionary style of diplomacy of the Maoist era. Instead of leading or supporting grandiose causes on the international stage, China was to follow a new strategy of "hiding one's brilliance and improving one's internal strength" (*tao guang yang hui*). Deng insisted that China was "not to carry any banner or be the head of anything" (*bu kangqi, bu dangtou*).

With the expansion of China's economic power, some Chinese analysts have questioned if this strategy is still reasonable and viable in the new millennium. They argue that this approach to international affairs—indeed the overall self-definition of China as a status-quo power—is no longer realistic and that China must seriously consider what role it should play in the world.¹⁰ But so far, the official foreign policy strategy has remained unchanged. A few examples illustrate China's continued caution.

⁹ When GNI per capita is controlled for, China's contributions to this fund are 1.6 times the size of the next largest donor out of the states in question. China's greater contributions to health initiatives and to poverty and humanitarian relief make sense given the fact that poverty and starvation have a more substantial impact on China than on Brazil and Russia. The World Bank poverty head-count ratio puts China at 15.92, more than quadruple the ratio for Brazil. Similarly, the Food and Agriculture Organization puts China's hunger rate at 10%, significantly higher than Brazil, which has a 6% hunger rate. Similarly, China's significant contributions to IFAD are likely caused by the importance of agriculture to China and the many benefits that IFAD has provided China over the years. In 2008, 39.6% of employed Chinese citizens were involved in agriculture, whereas only 17.4% of employed Brazilian citizens worked in agriculture. Furthermore, IFAD was one of the first funds to begin assisting China in 1981 and has contributed 24 projects totaling \$1,637.3 million to China to date. This is more than triple the amount that IFAD has contributed to Brazil and is indicative of the importance of this program to China.

¹⁰ Zhongying Pang, "China's Growing Role in Asian Regional Institutions" (lecture presented at a Sasakawa Peace Foundation seminar, Washington, D.C., December 11, 2006).

Since the 1990s, there has been a great deal of talk in different corners of the world about the rise of China. In 2003, Zheng Bijian, vice president of the Chinese Central Party School, gave a speech at the Boao Forum for Asia in which he spoke of China's "peaceful rise" (*heping jueqi*). Chinese leaders later used the phrase in some of their pronouncements, but it soon lost favor. Some in China feared that the mention of China's rise, peaceful or not, might fuel international anxiety over the so-called China threat. When Hu Jintao spoke to the Boao Forum in 2004, he only referred to China's "peaceful development" (*heping fazhan*). Since then, "peaceful development" has replaced "peaceful rise" in the official discourse.

In 2004 a Western observer coined the phrase "Beijing consensus" to characterize China's model of development.¹¹ In contrast to the neoliberal doctrine of the "Washington consensus," China's development was characterized by incremental reforms and continued state dominance in the economy. While this phrase caught the fancy of many outside China, Chinese officials have not endorsed the notion of a Beijing consensus. They are keenly aware of the United States' sensitivity to the prospect of a rival power and ideology.¹²

In the late 2000s, when much of the world fell into a deep financial crisis, China's economy was relatively stable. As a result, many countries have called on China to play a major role in reviving the world economy. Some U.S. scholars close to policy circles have put forth the idea of a group of two (G-2) consisting of the United States and China.¹³ In this scenario, the world's biggest debtor and its principal creditor would form a controlling regime for the world economy. More recently, the idea of a G-2 has gone beyond the economic realm. In an early 2009 speech celebrating the 30th anniversary of the normalization of Sino-American relations, former U.S. national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski proposed that China and the United States work together to set the agenda for international affairs. The Chinese government

¹¹ Joshua Cooper Ramo, *The Beijing Consensus* (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2004) ~ <http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/244.pdf>. Since Ramo first proposed the concept, the meaning of the Beijing consensus has evolved in ways that diverge from his original formulation. Recently, John Williamson, who earlier formulated the notion of the Washington consensus, presented a clearer definition of the Beijing consensus. See John Williamson, "Is the Beijing Consensus Now Dominant?" *Asia Policy*, no. 13 (2012): 1–16.

¹² "The Beijing Consensus Is to Keep Quiet," *Economist*, May 6, 2010.

¹³ C. Fred Bergsten, "A Partnership of Equals: How Washington Should Respond to China's Economic Challenge," *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 4 (2008): 57–69.

has flatly rejected this suggestion, arguing that this scheme of shared hegemony runs counter to China's anti-hegemonic principles.¹⁴

Why has China not been more involved in global governance? This article seeks to explain this phenomenon from the perspectives of both supply and demand.¹⁵ On the supply side, we examine China's motivation and capability: How much does China want to be involved in global governance? How capable is China of participating in global governance? On the demand side, we examine the attitude of the international community toward China: What is the general perception of China by the most influential members of the international community? Are they willing to let Beijing play a prominent role in global governance? The next two sections take turns examining these questions.

CHINESE MOTIVATIONS AND CAPABILITIES

This section identifies two factors that have shaped China's limited participation in global governance. First, China has limited interest in assuming a more prominent role in global governance due to both its foreign policy strategy and the severe challenges of domestic governance. Second, China has limited capability for participating in global governance due to its lack of ideational resources and to its domestic governance structure.

Limited Interests

Early in the reform era, Deng and other reform leaders decided that China's overwhelming priority was to achieve economic modernization. The new emphasis on modernizing the country's economy was not only a continuation of a time-honored Chinese ambition but a desperate act of self-preservation for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The CCP traditionally relied on its historical accomplishment (i.e., liberating China from imperialism, feudalism, and capitalism), the strong personalities of its leaders (especially Mao Zedong), and ideology (i.e., Communism) to maintain public support and acceptance. But three decades after the founding of the PRC, these

¹⁴ "Wen: China Disagrees to So-Called G-2, Calling for Effort to Fight Protectionism," *People's Daily*, November 18, 2009.

¹⁵ A different perspective focuses on China's political culture. The argument points to China's Hobbesian worldview, its transactional (rather than value-based) approach to human and interstate relations, and the expectation for the state (or its global equivalent) to provide for society as three factors shaping China's limited contribution to global governance. See Shambaugh, *China Goes Global*.

traditional foundations of the party's legitimacy had seriously eroded. By the late 1970s, the Chinese people had been through endless political upheavals and had become politically exhausted. Meanwhile, people had experienced little improvement in their standard of living. The promise of socialism was thus looking more and more elusive. To justify and sustain its monopoly on political power, the CCP urgently needed a new basis of legitimacy. The reformers led by Deng were keen to find one in economic development.

For the last three decades, this strategy has worked out well. China's economic success has given the Chinese people reasons to support the CCP regime. But this form of legitimacy is precarious and can be undermined or offset by the growing problems in Chinese society. For instance, the rapidly deteriorating environment in China, the rising socioeconomic disparity, and the frequent flare-ups of ethnic and political tension could all threaten the stability of the Communist regime. China's leaders are constantly preoccupied with the grim prospect of political chaos. This preoccupation has from time to time distracted policymakers' attention and undermined their ability to attend to international affairs beyond immediate foreign policy problems. For instance, on the eve of the 2009 G8+5 summit in Italy, Chinese policymakers made extensive preparations for Hu Jintao's policy speech, which was to be China's first official statement on global governance.¹⁶ But the unrest in Xinjiang compelled Hu to shorten his stay at the meeting, and in the end State Councilor Dai Bingguo read Hu's speech.¹⁷

The concern over regime legitimacy also constrains China's participation in global governance in another way. An aspect of global governance is the presumed validity of a number of "good governance" norms rooted in the Western experience, such as market competition, human rights, democracy, transparency, accountability, and the rule of law. Some of these norms are undoubtedly threatening to the way the CCP rules China. Thus far, Chinese leaders have only spoken about the PRC's participation in "global economic governance" (*quanqiu jingji zhili*).¹⁸ Some analysts in China boldly assert that the notion of global governance is a Western trap to subject China to Western standards.¹⁹ Given this concern, it is easy to see why the Chinese government

¹⁶ The G8+5 consists of the group of eight (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and the five leading emerging economies (Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa).

¹⁷ Z. Pang and H. Wang, "International Political Economy in China: International Institutions and Global Governance" (unpublished manuscript, 2011).

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ David Shambaugh, "Coping with a Conflicted China," *Washington Quarterly* 34, no. 1 (2011): 7–27.

has been extremely cautious about participating in global governance beyond a few narrow economic issue areas.

Limited Capability

In addition to limited interest, China's involvement in global governance has also been constrained by its limited capability, including a lack of clear ideas and effective policy instruments. Global governance is a relatively novel idea to Chinese policymakers. Although scholars introduced this concept to China as early as the mid-1990s, it was not until 2008 that the government first included it in an official document. This is not to say that issues of global governance have not featured prominently in Chinese academic and policy discourse. They have. However, Chinese discussions and pronouncements about global governance issues tend to be long on principles and short on details. Under the rubric of a "harmonious world," Chinese leaders have repeatedly called for the democratization of international relations, justice and common prosperity, diversity and tolerance, and the peaceful resolution of international conflicts.²⁰ But they have not put forth many specific ideas on how to achieve these noble goals.

One reason for the dearth of specific proposals and clear positions on issues of global governance may be that Chinese policymakers were not fully prepared for China's rapid rise. The country's development as a major economic power has been so fast that it has surpassed even the expectations of the leadership.²¹ Faced with this new position in the international system, heightened expectations from the international community, and strong reactions from other countries to everything China does, Chinese leaders and policy analysts are often caught off guard. In many cases, they are left scrambling to respond to the world in an *ad hoc* fashion rather than following a coherent blueprint.

For instance, in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007–8, the world turned its attention to China. Many in China recognized this as an opportunity for the PRC to put forth its own preferences and ideas about reforming the global financial and economic system. Yet as Chinese policy analysts, including a number of think tanks affiliated with the government, hurried to study what proposals to promote, they admitted to being unsure

²⁰ Hongying Wang and James N. Rosenau, "China and Global Governance," *Asian Perspective* 33, no. 3 (2009): 5–39.

²¹ Jisi Wang, "China's Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way," *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 2 (2011): 68–79.

about what exactly China wanted.²² In 2009, the governor of China's central bank caused an international stir by advocating that the dollar's role as the global currency be reduced. But since then, China has not followed up with any concrete policy proposals.

Another reason China has not developed many proposals or taken clear positions on controversial issues in global governance may be found in its multiple identities and ambiguous status in the international system. The Chinese government used to portray China as a victim of Western imperialism, a bastion of revolution, a third-world nation, and a socialist country. In recent decades, however, the leadership has emphasized China's position as a stakeholder in the international system, a reformer, and a responsible great power.²³ A survey of China's foreign-policy community reveals a wide spectrum of international identities that overlap and conflict with one another.²⁴ These identities prescribe different courses of action. Some oblige China to speak on behalf of developing countries, whereas others place China in the same camp as the dominant powers. Thus, it is impossible for China to take a simple stand on global governance.²⁵

In addition to a lack of clear ideas, China's domestic governance structure also undermines the country's capability for participating in some aspects of global governance. In particular, the weakness of Chinese NGOs is an obstacle for the PRC's effective involvement in global civil society.

With the onset of economic reforms in the late 1970s, the CCP has loosened its control of the Chinese economy and society to some degree, creating space for social organizations to develop. By the end of 2008, over 415,000 NGOs had registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, including about 230,000 social organizations, 183,000 noncommercial organizations, and 1,597 foundations.²⁶ However, many of these NGOs are closely tied to the government and lack autonomy. In 1996 a high official in the Ministry of Civil Affairs admitted that less than 50% of social organizations are self-organized, self-supported, and self-governed.²⁷ More recently, a prominent

²² Author's interview at a semi-official Chinese think tank, July 2008.

²³ Hongying Wang, "National Image Building and Chinese Foreign Policy," *China: An International Journal* 1, no. 1 (2003): 46–72.

²⁴ Shambaugh, "Coping with a Conflicted China."

²⁵ Yizhou Wang, "Lun Zhongguo waijiao zhuanxing" [On the Transformation of China's Diplomacy], *Xuexi yu tansuo*, no. 5 (2008).

²⁶ Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People's Republic of China, *2008 nian minzheng shiye fazhan tongji baogao* [Statistical Report of the Development of Civil Affairs in 2008] (Beijing, May 22, 2009) ~ <http://cws.mca.gov.cn/article/tjbg/200906/20090600031762.shtml>.

²⁷ Cited in Quisha Ma, "The Governance of NGOs in China since 1978: How Much Autonomy?" *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 31, no. 3 (2002): 305–28.

Chinese expert on social organizations observed that, according to Western standards, very few Chinese social organizations can be considered NGOs.²⁸

In general, all NGOs in China are subject to the control of the government. This is especially true for organizations working on sensitive issues, such as foreign policy. As a result, China's foreign relations largely remain the exclusive domain of state policy and are managed through official interactions with other governments. To the extent that Chinese foreign policymakers have played up the importance of nongovernmental relationships, or what they call people-to-people diplomacy, the organizations that carry out such unofficial diplomacy function like branches of the Chinese government. Some of them have long served as organs of the government, such as the All-China Women's Federation, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the Chinese Communist Youth League, and the Chinese People's Association for Friendships with Foreign Countries, including all of its subordinate associations. Some groups have been newly established in the reform era, but most of them also maintain close ties with the government and follow its guidance. The China Environmental Protection Foundation and the Boao Forum for Asia are such examples. As discussed in the last section, Chinese NGOs have had minimal presence at global summits organized by the UN in recent years, and only a handful of Chinese NGOs, including the All-China Women's Federation, the China Society for Human Rights Studies, and the China Disabled Persons' Federation, have consultative status with the UN.

Not surprisingly, then, Chinese NGOs have not been a source of influential ideas and proposals for global governance, in sharp contrast with the NGOs in many other countries. For instance, a former politician in Canada was the source of the notion of the group of twenty (G-20), a province in Brazil inspired the idea for the World Social Forum, an intellectual in Bangladesh pioneered the institution of Grameen Bank, and an American teacher began and led the movement to ban landmines. One is hard pressed to think of such innovative and effective contributions to global governance originating from China. Both Chinese analysts and observers of China have made the point that the weakness of its civil society is a major handicap for the country's foreign policy and ability to participate effectively in global governance.²⁹

²⁸ X. Kang, "Zhuanxing shiqi de Zhongguo shetuan" [Chinese Social Organizations in the Period of Transition] (paper presented at the International Conference of the Development of the Non-profit Organizations and the China Project Hope, 1999).

²⁹ Ying Yu, "The Role and Future of Civil Society in a Transitional China," *Political Perspectives* 1, no. 1 (2007): 1-35; and Minxin Pei, "China's Political Awakening?" *Diplomat*, July 14, 2010.

THE ATTITUDE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Beijing's limited participation in global governance is also related to the attitude of the international community toward China.³⁰ After opening its doors to the outside world 30 years ago, has China become a full member of the international community? Turning from the supply side to the demand side, this section explores how China is seen by the rest of the world. It begins with a discussion of general survey results across countries and then examines the perceptions of China held in several major countries.

Table 2 provides data taken from surveys conducted on perceptions of China.³¹ The data indicates that the international community as a whole demonstrates a great deal of ambivalence regarding China. The BBC World Service survey asked respondents from a number of countries whether China's influence is mostly positive or negative. An average of the responses from all the countries surveyed from the inception of the poll in 2005 until 2012 shows that 44.4% see China's influence as mostly positive and 33.3% see it as primarily negative. The Global Attitudes Project, run by the Pew Research Center, similarly asked respondents from a range of countries whether they held a favorable or unfavorable view of China. Taking the average of all countries over the course of the poll shows that 51.4% had a favorable view. In 2008, Gallup surveyed the populations of 69 countries and asked whether they approved or disapproved of China's leadership. An average of only 39.1% approved of China's top leaders. Finally, a 2007 survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs indicates widespread concern over whether China can be trusted to act responsibly in world affairs. Conducted in 18 countries with 56% of the world's population, the survey found that only

³⁰ "International community" is not a well-defined concept. A few years ago, *Foreign Policy* gathered a group of notable thinkers, activists, journalists, and policymakers of various ideological persuasions to discuss the meaning of this term. The preface of the forum states that "this feel-good phrase evokes a benevolent, omniscient entity that makes decisions and takes action for the benefit of all countries and peoples. But invoking the international community is a lot easier than defining it." See "What is the International Community?" *Foreign Policy*, September/October 2002. What is the international community? Does it exist? Who are its members? Who makes decisions for the international community? These are important questions often left unanswered by those invoking the term. This article does not use "international community" to refer to an objective and fixed entity, nor does the term as used here imply legitimacy. It is used simply as a shorthand to describe the most influential international organizations, transnational NGOs, and countries that share common norms and goals in various issue areas.

³¹ Polls include "BBC Country Rating Poll," BBC World Service, Globe Scan/PIPA, 2005–12; "Transatlantic Trends," German Marshall Fund, 2003–11 ~ <http://trends.gmfus.org/transatlantic-trends/about/>; "Opinion of China," Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Project, Key Indicators Database, 2002 and 2005–12 ~ <http://www.pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=24&survey=1&response=Favorable&mode=chart>; "Global Views," Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2007; and Julie Ray, "China's Leadership Better Regarded Outside the West," Gallup, April 29, 2008 ~ <http://www.gallup.com/poll/106858/Chinas-Leadership-Better-Regarded-Outside-West.aspx>.

TABLE 2
Perceptions of China

Poll	BBC Country Rating, 2005–12 (%)	Transatlantic Trends, 2003–8 (points out of 100)	Global Attitudes Project, 2003–11 (%)	Gallup, 2008 (%)	Chicago Council, 2007 (%)
Positive views					
Total average	44	–	51	39	38
Western average	34	47	46	18	–
Negative views					
Total average	33	–	–	–	52
Western average	48	–	–	–	–

38% of respondents believed that China could be trusted to act responsibly in world affairs, whereas 52% thought that China could not be trusted. The latter group included 76% of the French, 65% of Argentines, 61% of South Koreans, 58% of Americans, and 56% of Russians. Overall, these polls indicate mixed perceptions of China in the international community.

Looking only at Western states, particularly the United States, Canada, and European countries, perceptions of China are decidedly more negative. Given their dominance in the international community, it makes sense to look more closely at public opinion in those countries. The BBC World Service poll indicates that among Western states, an average of 33.6% saw China's influence as positive and 48.4% saw it as negative. The Transatlantic Trends survey asked respondents in several Western states to rate their feeling toward China on a 100-point scale. The average response was 46.6, indicating a mildly negative impression. The Global Attitudes Project found that an average of 46.2% of respondents in Western states viewed China favorably, again indicating a somewhat unfavorable view of China in the West. Finally, Western views of China's leadership are particularly negative. While the average response for all states polled in the Gallup Leadership Approval survey was 39.1% positive, the average response for Western states was only 17.9% positive. Overall, Western perceptions of China are quite negative.

This polling data shows that the international community holds a rather ambivalent view of China. A brief review of public opinion in the United States, Europe, Japan, and India will help clarify the picture further.³²

In the United States, both the public and policymakers held very negative views of China during the years up to the early 1970s, “refusing to award China any sense of legitimacy or authority.”³³ After President Richard Nixon’s visit to China, American perceptions of China improved dramatically. Before Mikhail Gorbachev’s new thinking relaxed the hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s, Americans regarded China as a potential strategic ally. Fascinated by the economic and political reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping, Americans began to view China as the first Communist country to abandon socialism in favor of capitalism and democracy. But the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989 abruptly reversed American perception of China. China was now perceived as a threat to everything that the United States stood for—democracy, capitalism, and freedom. Since then, American attitudes toward China have been marked by profound ambivalence. On the one hand, the public in the United States is repulsed by China’s political system and its policies regarding Taiwan and Tibet. On the other hand, Americans are profoundly impressed by China’s economic growth and attracted by the Chinese market.³⁴

European perceptions of China have also evolved over time. During the 1950s and the 1960s, Western Europeans shared some of the negative views held by their American counterparts, though their hostility was not as extreme. Indeed, several European countries were among the first to recognize the newly established PRC. In the mid-1970s, Western European countries improved their relations with China, and both the elite and the public in those countries came to see China as a potential economic and strategic partner.³⁵ Like in the United States, the tragedy of 1989 turned around public opinion in Europe. That event, as well as the issue of Tibet, has haunted European perceptions of China to this day. For several years after 1990, the European Union sponsored resolutions criticizing China in the UN Human Rights

³² The following discussion draws extensively on Hongying Wang, “Understanding the Intangible in International Relations: The Cultural Dimension of China’s Integration with the International Community,” in *China and International Relations: The Chinese View and the Contribution of Wang Gungwu*, ed. Yongnian Zheng (New York: Routledge, 2010), 206–8, 210–12.

³³ Michael G. Kulma, “The Evolution of U.S. Images of China: A Political Psychology Perspective of Sino-American Relations,” *World Affairs* 162, no. 2 (1999): 76–88.

³⁴ Charles Tien and James A. Nathan, “The Polls-Trends: American Ambivalence toward China,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 65, no. 1 (2001): 124–38.

³⁵ David Shambaugh, “China and Europe,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 519 (1992): 101–14.

Commission. In the middle to late 1990s, Europeans adopted a pragmatic view of China as a major economic opportunity and tried to reconcile human rights concerns with economic interests.³⁶

Japan's view of China is somewhat distinct from the American and European views because of the geographic proximity and historical relations between the two countries. Long before they established formal diplomatic relations in the mid-1970s, Japan developed various informal ties with China. Many in Japanese society held positive and sympathetic views toward China, which were profoundly shaped by the ancient history of Chinese cultural influence over Japan and the more recent history of Japan's invasion of China during World War II. Further, Japanese business communities aspired to exploit economic opportunities in China. As soon as Japan was able to normalize its official relationship with China, these sentiments translated into massive Japanese development aid.³⁷ The crackdown on students and other demonstrators by the Chinese government in 1989 did not generate the same level of disgust in Japan as it did elsewhere in the world. Under international pressure, the Japanese government froze aid programs to China but only for a very short time.³⁸ By the mid-1990s, however, the special status China enjoyed in the Japanese psyche had eroded. Rapid economic growth and military modernization have caused many in Japan to view the PRC as a threat. Meanwhile, new generations of Japanese are much less affected by a sense of guilt toward China.³⁹

Among the major developing countries in the world, India has been especially attentive to China, in part because of the geographic proximity between the two countries. In the 1950s, under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's influence, many in India developed a romantic view of "a thousand million strong cooperative of the Chinese and the Indian people," although it was tempered by fears of the long-term threat of a powerful and centralized Chinese state.⁴⁰ Later, the 1962 border war deeply humiliated India and reinforced a negative image of China. To this day, India's China watchers are divided between two extremes. One extreme sees China as aggressive and

³⁶ Kay Möller, "Diplomatic Relations and Mutual Strategic Perceptions: China and the European Union," *China Quarterly* 169 (2002): 10–32.

³⁷ Quansheng Zhao, "Japan's Aid Diplomacy with China," in *Japan's Foreign Aid: Power and Policy in a New Era*, ed. Bruce M. Koppel and Robert M. Orr Jr. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).

³⁸ Saori N. Katada, "Why Did Japan Suspend Foreign Aid to China? Japan's Foreign Aid Decision-Making and Sources of Aid Sanction," *Social Science Japan Journal* 4, no. 1 (2001): 39–58.

³⁹ Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, "Chinese Apprehensions about Revitalization of the U.S.-Japan Alliance," *Asian Survey* 37, no. 4 (1997): 383–402.

⁴⁰ Gyaneshwar Chaturvedi, *India-China Relations: 1947 to Present Day* (Agra: M.G. Publishers, 1991).

expansive, whereas the other sees it as a benign neighbor, a fellow ancient civilization, and an anti-colonial, anti-West partner.⁴¹ Meanwhile, to ordinary Indians, China remains a mysterious, unfathomable, inscrutable nation that generates both romance and suspicion at the same time.⁴² As one observer has commented, between India and China there is a “lack of mutual awareness, understanding, and trust.”⁴³

If the perceptions of China by these countries are indicative of more general trends, it is fair to say that the international community is highly ambivalent toward China.⁴⁴ The positive perceptions are often based on instrumental calculations, such as China’s strategic and economic values, rather than identity solidarity, except to some degree in India. Overall, the international community has not come to see China as “one of us.”

In light of such mixed feelings, it is unsurprising that the international community has not always been enthusiastic about China assuming a more prominent role in global governance. For instance, many American analysts have expressed concern over how China’s involvement in various areas of global governance—such as trade, investment, finance, natural resources, energy, innovation, and technology standards—may undermine the fundamental principles of the current international system and negatively affect the interests of the United States.⁴⁵ Likewise, some European policy analysts have called for Europe to ally with the United States and China’s neighbors in Asia to contain the negative impact of China on a series of global governance issues.⁴⁶ As a seasoned analyst of U.S. and European foreign policy has remarked, there “exists ambivalence in Western discussions: while many call for a more internationally engaged China in terms of contributing to security and economic development, others are not at all comfortable with China developing and expanding its military reach and aid programs into various parts of the world.”⁴⁷

⁴¹ C.V. Ranganathan and V.C. Khanna, *India and China: The Way Ahead After “Mao’s India War”* (New Delhi: Har Anand, 2000).

⁴² Amitabh Mattoo, “Imagining China,” in *The Peacock and the Dragon: India-China Relations in the 21st Century*, ed. Kanti Bajpai and Amitabh Mattoo (New Delhi: Har Anand, 2000): 13–25.

⁴³ Swaran Singh, “India-China Relations: Perception, Problems, Potential,” *South Asian Survey* 15, no. 1 (2008): 83–98.

⁴⁴ Russia is seen in the same light. See Michael J. Mazzer, “The Clash of Civilizations?” *Washington Quarterly* 19, no. 2 (1996): 177–97.

⁴⁵ See, for example, Elizabeth C. Economy, “The Game Changer: Coping with China’s Foreign Policy Revolution,” *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 6 (2010): 142–53.

⁴⁶ François Godement, “A Global China Policy,” European Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Brief, June 2010 ≈ <http://ecfr.eu/page/-/documents/A-global-China-policy.pdf>.

⁴⁷ Shambaugh, *China Goes Global*.

What, then, are the reasons that the international community sees China as an outsider? The most obvious answer is China's political system. The Cold War was a period of intense ideological competition between capitalism and Communism, manifested in the rivalry between the Western bloc led by the United States and the Eastern bloc led by the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the collapse of the Eastern bloc, including the Soviet Union itself, Western societies were euphoric about their apparent victory in the competition, and policymakers and analysts rushed to declare the triumph of the market economy and democratic politics.⁴⁸ China turned out to be a major exception to the rule. With Communist governments failing almost everywhere else—with the dubious exceptions of North Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam—the CCP nonetheless managed to stay in power. Moreover, in the last twenty years the regime seems to have become stronger than ever. Economically, it has presided over the fastest growth of a national economy that the world has ever seen. The CCP has done so not by following the neoliberal orthodoxy represented by the Washington consensus. Instead, it has achieved this economic miracle by mixing incremental market reforms with continued state domination of the economy, in the process developing what might be called a Chinese model. Politically, the CCP has relinquished little of its monopoly on power. Thus, in the post-Cold War era, China has stood out as an ideological outlier in the world, challenging the universal validity of economic liberalism and political democracy. Although the elite, especially the business elite, may subordinate their distaste for China's political system to their recognition of the country's strategic and economic importance, for ordinary people in Western societies the Communist and authoritarian nature of the regime seems to be a major obstacle to embracing China more fully.⁴⁹

Another explanation for the suspicion toward China on the part of the international community may be found in the difference in values. Scholars of the English school have written extensively on international society.⁵⁰ They assume that countries that form an international society share common interests and values. While some of these scholars define common values as state sovereignty, nonintervention, and minimalist cooperation (the pluralist stream), others see common values as shared beliefs regarding more encompassing issues such as rights, justice, and morality (the solidarist

⁴⁸ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

⁴⁹ Tien and Nathan, "The Polls-Trends."

⁵⁰ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1977).

stream). The solidarists argue that “we must assume that a states-system will not come into being without a degree of cultural unity among its members.”⁵¹ This line of academic argument has been mirrored in the political rhetoric of some Asian leaders. About two decades ago, political leaders, such as Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew and Malaysia’s Mahathir bin Mohamad, and public intellectuals developed the notion of “Asian values.” They argue that Asian countries (by which they refer primarily to countries in East Asia) are culturally different from the West. Asians do not regard individual freedom to be as important as it is regarded in the West.

This line of argument has been hotly debated by scholars, pundits, human rights groups, and others.⁵² Obviously this concept is problematic. One can question whether Asian countries have a set of common values given how diverse the region is internally. One can also question if the values labeled as “Asian values” are distinctively Asian. Leaving aside these flaws of the concept, it is nonetheless undeniable that across time and space different societies have different value systems. Just as the values held by Europeans today are not the same as those held by their ancestors during medieval times, the values of Western societies today are quite different from those prevalent in China. One of the most important values held by Westerners in general and Americans in particular is individualism. For them, individual freedom and individual rights are nearly sacred. In contrast, in Chinese society, individual interests have long been subordinated to the interests of the community. People tend to place a relatively low value on individual liberty if it comes at the expense of community well-being. For instance, according to the 2011 Pew Global Attitudes Project, China was among the least individualistic countries, whereas the United States and Canada were among the most individualistic countries. As an illustration of the Chinese attitude toward individual rights, the same survey found overwhelming public acceptance of the one-child policy, with over three quarters of the respondents approving of the policy.⁵³ This finding suggests that Western criticism that China’s population policy violates basic

⁵¹ Martin Wight, *Systems of States* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977), 33.

⁵² Amartya Sen, *Human Rights and Asian Values* (New York: Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, 1997); and Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell, eds., *The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

⁵³ This finding is based on the results of the 2009 and 2011 surveys, where respondents were asked, “Please tell me whether you agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with the following statements...Success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside our control.” The Pew Global Attitudes Project has previously used this question to evaluate the extent of individualism in different states. China was one of the countries where the fewest respondents disagreed with the statement, while the United States and Canada were among the countries where the most respondents disagreed with it. See Pew Global Attitudes Project Question Database, Pew Research Center ~ <http://www.pewglobal.org/question-search/?qid=908&cnt>.

individual rights does not resonate with the majority of the Chinese people. This and other examples point to the real and significant divergence in values between China and the mainstream international community.

Differences in political systems and values are potentially complicated by a third factor—the factor of race. Race is a socially constructed category rather than a fixed biological category. Yet, once constructed, it becomes quite real in separating groups of people in the world. For a variety of reasons, scholars of international relations have not paid systematic attention to race.⁵⁴ Indeed, in conventional international relations theory, there is a “well-trained silence” around issues of race.⁵⁵ However, race and racism occupy a central role in world politics. They have profoundly shaped colonialism, immigration policies, genocide, memberships in international organizations, and other types of international relations.⁵⁶ Power transitions have always been accompanied by anxiety, and the rise of China as a non-white country may well add another layer of anxiety for the predominantly white countries that make up the mainstream of the international community. This should not be surprising. After all, when Japan was at the height of its economic ascendance in the 1980s, it generated a great deal of resentment in the United States. Even though Japan’s economic and political systems are not fundamentally different from those of Western countries, and even though its investment in the United States trailed investment from the United Kingdom and Canada, politicians and the general public showed much more anxiety over Japanese purchases of U.S. properties, leading many observers to conclude that racism was at play.⁵⁷ The same phenomenon could be unfolding today with regard to China. As one scholar puts it, “China, a non-white state, is on its way to becoming the number one world power.... The international system remains still a white dominant racially stratified system.... Will the white dominant powers peacefully accept a diminution of their position in the international system?”⁵⁸

⁵⁴ Geeta Chowdhry and Shirin M. Rai, “The Geographies of Exclusion and the Politics of Inclusion: Race-Based Exclusions in the Teaching of International Relations,” *International Studies Perspectives* 10, no. 1 (2009): 84–91.

⁵⁵ Randolph B. Persaud, “Situating Race in International Relations: The Dialectics of Civilizational Security in American Immigration,” in *Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations: Reading Race, Gender and Class*, ed. Geeta Chowdhry and Sheila Nair (New York: Routledge, 2002), 56–81.

⁵⁶ Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Color Line: White Men’s Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); and Tilden J. Le Melle, “Race and International Relations,” *International Studies Perspectives* 10, no. 1 (2009): 77–83.

⁵⁷ D. Boaz, “Yellow Peril Reinfests America,” *Wall Street Journal*, April 7, 1989.

⁵⁸ Le Melle, “Race and International Relations.”

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

What should the United States do, if anything, about China's relatively low level of participation in global governance? Assuming China will continue to gain more material power in the foreseeable future, it is in the United States' interest to increase Chinese involvement in global governance.

First, as China gains more strength, it will become more assertive in pursuing its interests. There are already plenty of signs of this happening: China's economic reach is expanding in Africa and Latin America, its attitude toward territorial controversies vis-à-vis neighboring countries in East Asia is hardening, its military budget is increasing, and Chinese representatives at international forums are growing more arrogant. China can pursue its national interests either by "going it alone" or by remaining embedded in the networks of global governance, even as Beijing seeks to modify the rules to its preferences. As history makes clear, a more embedded rising power is less likely to be a threat to the existing international order.⁵⁹

Second, global governance is a collective enterprise. In this post-hegemonic age, the provision of global public goods depends on the involvement and cost-sharing of all the major players in world politics.⁶⁰ Emerging powers such as China have an important role to play in making personnel, financial, and ideational contributions to global governance.

As our analysis suggests, China's underparticipation in global governance has resulted from low supply and demand. On the one hand, the Chinese government lacks interest in deeper involvement because of its own insecurity. China also lacks the capacity for fuller participation both because it was unprepared for its own rapid rise and because of its multiple and potentially conflicting international identities, as well as owing to the weakness of its civil society. There is little outsiders can do to change the supply side of China's participation in global governance, which will change with time and largely in response to political reforms inside China. Yet one limited way that the international community could help bolster China's capacity for contributing to global governance is via NGO partnerships. The United States and others can help foster the development of China's civil society organizations by encouraging partnerships between Chinese NGOs and foreign governments,

⁵⁹ Interwar Japan and post-World War II Germany each represent a good example of what will likely happen when a rising power is outside the multilateral governance framework and when it is embedded therein.

⁶⁰ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

foundations, and NGOs. In particular, partnering with Chinese NGOs that have fewer direct ties to the Chinese government could help these autonomous elements of Chinese civil society gain recognition and resources. Overall, however, the ability of the international community to shape China from within is limited.

On the other hand, China's underparticipation is also related to the low level of enthusiasm on the part of the international community for China to play a more prominent role in global governance. In the last decade or so, policymakers in the United States, other Western countries, and major international organizations have asked China to take on more responsibility in areas ranging from nuclear nonproliferation to rebalancing the global economy. But they continue to harbor profound distrust toward China and regard China as an outsider. This attitude in turn limits China's involvement in various multilateral programs and initiatives. Here, on the demand side, it is possible for the United States and other countries to do more to encourage China to assume a bigger role in global governance by embracing China as a member of the international community. If China is allowed to participate more fully in the inner circles of decision-making of various multilateral groups and is accorded the status and influence commensurate to its contribution to global public goods, Beijing may well assume a more active role in global governance.

The United States and other Western countries could express enthusiasm for and encourage China's involvement in global governance forums in a number of ways. First, they should push for greater cooperation on noncontentious global governance issues where both sides share a clear interest. Poverty reduction and disaster relief, for instance, are areas where Western states and China have common interests. Focusing on boosting mutually beneficial cooperation on these issues first, rather than being paralyzed by more contentious ones like climate change or Iranian nuclear development, would establish precedents for China acting as a partner in global frameworks. It would also build trust between China and the other major stakeholders in the international community, making the international community more receptive to a broader role for China. Second, U.S. leaders should avoid inflaming the public by using China-bashing rhetoric. There are obviously areas where U.S. and Chinese interests diverge and the two countries will inevitably disagree. U.S. leaders should acknowledge these differences but should also avoid demonizing China to score political points at home. Unduly harsh rhetoric with regard to China will reduce enthusiasm among Western publics for Beijing to take on a greater role in managing global issues.

The interplay of domestic and international factors will continue to shape China's involvement in global governance. To speculate on the future of China's role, it may be useful to remember an interesting parallel a few decades ago. After World War I, the United States emerged as the largest and strongest economic and military power in the world. However, it did not immediately assume a leading role in international affairs commensurate with its material power. Indeed, the Senate blocked U.S. membership in the League of Nations, an organization President Woodrow Wilson helped create, as well as in the World Court. The United States also rejected possible military alliances with France and Britain, choosing instead to return to isolationism for much of the interwar period. The reluctance of the United States to play a more prominent role in international affairs was largely due to the interaction between the international environment of the interwar period and domestic politics, including the American ideological tradition and strategic culture. But as the international environment evolved, its interaction with the domestic forces in the United States also changed. After World War II, Washington adopted an entirely different grand strategy, becoming highly involved in world affairs.⁶¹

Like with the United States in the 20th century, a dramatic change in China's role in the world in the 21st century, especially its role in global governance, will probably come out of a new combination of international and domestic forces. But in contrast with the United States in the aftermath of World War II, China's new role in global governance will more likely result from domestic developments rather than from an evolution of the international environment. Political change in China that both enhances the legitimacy of the CCP and expands civil society, combined with greater acceptance by the international community, could greatly expand China's participation in global governance. However, that prospect remains highly uncertain. ◆

⁶¹ Colin Dueck, "Realism, Culture, and Grand Strategy: Explaining America's Peculiar Path to World Power," *Security Studies* 14, no. 2 (2005): 195–231.