Elinor Ostrom,
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action.
"Much
of the world is dependent on resources that are subject to the possibility of a
tragedy of the commons."
p. 3.
"The paradox
that individually rational strategies lead to collectively irrational outcomes
seems to challenge a fundamental faith [since the
Enlightenment] that
rational human beings can achieve rational results."
"Quite simply,
these paradoxes cast in doubt our understanding of rationality and, in the case
of the Prisoner's Dilemma suggest that it is impossible for rational creatures
to cooperate. Thus, they bear directly on fundamental issues in ethics and
political philosophy and threaten the foundations of the social sciences."
Richmond Campbell. Paradoxes
of Rationality and Cooperation.
p. 5.
"I would
rather address the question of how to enhance the capabilities of those
involved to change the constraining rules of the game to lead to outcomes other
than remorseless tragedies."
p. 7.
"Without valid
and reliable information, a central agency could make several errors, including
setting the carrying capacity or the fine to high or too low, sanctioning
herders who cooperate, or not sanctioning defectors. The implications of all
forms of incomplete information are interesting."
p. 10.
"Instead of
presuming that the individuals sharing a commons are inevitably caught in a
trap from which they cannot escape, I argue that the capacity of individuals to
extricate themselves from various types of dilemma situations varies from
situation to situation."
p. 14.
"Institutions
are rarely either private or public – 'the market' or 'the state.' Many
successful CPR institutions are rich mixtures of 'private-like' and
'public-like' institutions defying classification in a sterile dichotomy."
p. 14.
"Consequently,
the only feasible agreement–and the equilibrium of the resulting game
– is for both herders to share equally the sustainable yield levels of
the meadow and costs of enforcing their agreement so long as each herder's
share of the cost of enforcement is less than 10.
p. 16.
Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of
Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge U.K.: Cambridge University Press,
2009.
